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ANYONE WRITING about kinship today does so in the middle of a long
anthropological conversation. Here I focus on a largely unexamined but
much used concept, the relation, and on a practice that veers from being
the object of intense scrutiny to being taken for granted, that of description.
Some brief evidence suggesting why these are interesting issues to consider
together serves as an introduction.
A Question of Choice
At one point in his splendid account of the Korowai people of West
Papua, Rupert Stasch refers to kinship terms as describing, and he quotes
a fellow anthropologist’s felicitous phrase, forms of « being-in-relation ».
The context is a discussion of kin categories : « the categories say that a
persons is his or her relations with certain others » (Stasch 2009 : 132,
emphasis in the original). The quotation seemingly spells this out, conti-
nuing : « The terms of kinship are inherently linking terms ; […] they
render the self in and through its relation to certain others » (Faubion
2001 : 3). In a way Stasch hardly needs to back up his statement – his
description of how Korowai reflect on the world is replete with references
to a relationality articulated as kinship. Thus the Korowai term for 
« relative or kin » can refer to anyone with whom a connection is recognised,
and indeed Stasch remarks that it does the functional work of his own
terms, « link, relation, and belonging » (2009 : 104-105, emphasis
omitted). He also makes it clear that such relations enfold what he calls
otherness and strangeness within them, as in the emphasis put on main-
taining relations with one’s mother’s brother. Differentiated by clanship
and place-ownership, nonetheless, as a nephew said, squeezing his own
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« Relations have become the ontological language of social anthropology,
thus constraining our analytical imaginaries » (Alberto Corsín Jiménez [2004])
The nephew’s gesture echoes a moment in Tony Crook’s account from
Bolivip, over the border in Papua New Guinea. His Angkaiyakmin teacher
pretended to make an incision in his thigh, then put his hands onto the
ethnographer’s skin ; he said « that now his skin has gone onto mine, and
that my skin has gone onto his […] we are “one skin” » (2007 : 29). The
result of an exchange between them (advice for care), teacher and ethno-
grapher mutually encompassed each other. The shiny membrane covering
the thigh muscle, which the teacher’s gesture had opened up, is Crook 
was told, « another word for love » (Ibid. : 113). Like Stasch he describes
the way connections make divisions, and how every phenomenon is 
a combination of differences. Unlike him, however, Crook claims that
Angkaiyakmin have no language for relations : « [p]articipation of persons
and things in each other is conceived without an idiom of “relationality” »
(Ibid. : 28) 1. Crook is here deliberately standing apart from the usage 
of most fellow anthropologists in his explicit aim « to make “social 
relationships” disappear from description of Bolivip » (Ibid.).
Two rather different gestures, but two images – descriptions – of bodily
mutuality. However, the point of comparison lies in the anthropologists’
descriptions. The one chooses to emphasise relationality at every turn, the
other tries to expunge it from (part of ) his vocabulary. Both do a highly
successful job, but how come there is choice ?
Choice was foreshadowed in the opening sentences that brought toge-
ther two ways in which the idea of relation operates : identification and
linking (of terms, of persons). Thus Stasch refers to « an almost seamless »
identification of persons with relations, and then goes on, in good English
idiom, to talk of relations « between » kin (2009 : 132). Now the English
language makes it quite possible either to speak of two kinds of relations,
or else to take one kind (the linking of terms), as an exemplar of relations
while choosing to deal with the other (identification) as an absence of 
relation. Where Stasch wants to underline Korowai sensibilities towards
relations and their need to make them, Crook wants to ask what it is that
Angkaiyakmin make when they take relationality for granted.
Such linguistic choice is not confined to the concept of relation, but I
suggest that this concept is one of many places where the English language
– and the anthropology it encourages – teases its users. The problems it at
once solves and generates are probably not translatable. If only because of
the extent to which « kinship » is in English invariably, and tautologously,
expanded into « kinship relations », the concept of relation is worth some
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1. That is, not mediated by the act of naming social relations, relationality is simply assumed.
interrogation. I focus on certain constructions of motherhood and fathe-
rhood to do so. But first let me be explicit about the approach to kinship
entailed in re-rendering this material.
An Approach to Kinship : Making Description a Problematic
The central problematic for the anthropologist is mundane : what has
to be done (understood, analysed, theorised) in order to gain adequacy of
description ? Briefly put in relation to kinship, now that we know what
kinship is (Sahlins 2011), the question is how to describe it.
One must be immeasurably grateful to Marshall Sahlins for his at once
elegant and extensive elucidation of the idea of kinship as that « mutuality
of being » or those « mutual relations of being » that define how people
imagine themselves as intrinsic to one another’s existence. It is notable that
his account is shot through with telling images drawn from the many
ethnographic sources informing his general proposition ; we shall return to
this. Now in one sense the identification or definition of kinship consti-
tutes a description. Yet, in another, my question is opened up in his own
conclusion, for it hints at further links. He points to Eduardo Viveiros de
Castro’s work as a « revelation of a certain cultural order of intersubjecti-
vity in which kinship takes a fundamental place » ; for kinship is to be
understood in terms « of its relations to other dimensions of cultural
order » (Sahlins 2011 : 239). Kinship’s relations to cultural order ? It would
seem to follow that much will depend on how kinship in this or that
context is rendered in the first place.
Their ethnographers make it clear that, in talking about people’s effects
upon one another, both Korowai and Angkaiyakmin are also talking about
what English speakers would call the world, the cosmos, nature-culture.
The manner in which kinship is articulated will indeed bear on how the
world is lived (the specific truth of this for English-speakers will become
apparent). The corollary for anthropological description is obvious :
choice of concept influences the way in which the anthropologist’s subject
matter is formulated. Hence Crook’s proposition, how it looks when social
relationships are made to disappear.
Although other matters were in his mind, Louis Dumont’s well known
complaint about the difficulties the British have « with their own language
when it comes to defining kinship » (2006 [1971] : 3), and how this gets
in the way of creating a scientific vocabulary, could have been applied to
relations. Like Korowai, the English idiom for kinspersons is « relations »
(also « relatives »), a concept used equally for any kind of identification or

























Kinship as a Relation
the world at large, in short, to relations between phenomena. As we shall
see, this does not make the world a kin-based one 2. On the contrary,
English-speakers have no difficulty in keeping these connotations distinct
by context. So, whether compartmentalising the connotations or running
them together, we are already in a rather particular world.
Now the topic of kinship does not render the approach taken here any
different from an approach to anthropological description at large. At the
same time, there is a specificity about anthropological writings on kinship
that invites further elucidation. The opening accounts from today’s 
Melanesia rehearse a substantive issue that has lain behind generations 
of kinship studies. At once an attribute of kinship systems as such and 
an attribute of how they might be described, the issue is the significance
of relationality. Relations and relationships suffuse anthropological
accounts in general, but it is in trying to convey the specificity of kinship
that anthropologists dwell on relating as a veritable force in social life. 
The idea of kinship, we might conclude, evokes a cultural order 3. We
could as well speak of conceptual world, as Roy Wagner (1977 : 627)
argued a generation ago (« [We should] begin our analysis with some
particular conceptual world, and with a set of assumptions about concep-
tual worlds in general, rather than a general orientation regarding “kinship
systems” ») ; or of Tsing’s (2009) adoption of the term worlding 4. 
This chapter is about cultural orders or conceptual worlds in which 
relations are key. In the course of it, practices of description may start
looking a little less mundane 5.
A preliminary hint is there in Dumont’s comments. One criticism he
had of British kinship analysis in his day was the propensity to distribute
« social reality into different sub-systems » (2006 : 11). What conceptual
world is implied here ? The English usage of « relations » is illustrative.
The contextualising practices by which English-speakers effortlessly
keep as separate relations between kin and relations as a narrative of
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2. Relations as used between phenomena, social or natural, do not have their basis in the kin
usage ; on the contrary, the kin usage arguably has its historical precedent in the narration (the
« relating ») of connections between phenomena. In any case relations between persons do not
necessarily mean between kinspersons ; see Vincent Descombes on « concepts and social relations »
as « two sides of the same coin » (2000 : 41).
3. Kinship does not disappear when it is perceived as a dimension of cultural order ; rather, it is
made to appear, as in Marshall Sahlins’s gift of a definition. To some extent the text that follows
tells its own tale ; thus, alerted to the term, the reader will encounter manifold usages of the
concept of relation in this chapter.
4. Although she sees « worlding » as a proposition about context, in its expanded form it refers 
to « world-making dreams and practices » (Tsing 2009 : 62).
5. With a different focus, this is what Tony Crook’s volume (2007) takes seriously ; its intriguing
outcome is best encountered in the text itself.
connection relevant to any phenomena, natural or otherwise, support
a general propensity to compartmentalisation. So while « domain » may
have gone largely out of fashion in anthropological parlance, « context »
remains indispensable. I do not have to add that in vernacular social 
life English kinship emerges as a distinct sub-system or domain of rela-
tions (for historical and cultural reasons that make the English view of
family life something of an oddity in Europe), so Anglophone anthro-
pologists working in places such as Melanesia will find « kinship » 
occupying another kind of social space. Yet they may circumscribe its
dimensions by implying that in being « related to » other phenomena
kinship itself constitutes a separate domain. The English language gets
them into this, despite efforts to argue the contrary. So how can one
avoid being left with the compartments one begins with ? A preliminary
conclusion is that anthropologists probably need to go on doing what
they have always done, and supplement what they mean through diverse
imaginative devices.
Motherhood and Fatherhood
The propensity to divide mother’s kin from father’s kin, a general
feature of kinship systems in Melanesia, springs as much from the
marriage that brought them together as from distinctness of parental
origins. The divisions may be depicted as two « sides » (of persons, of rela-
tions). The theoretical interest of this lies in the generalised sense in which
all those to whom someone is related through mother or father share
qualities in which the relevant parent also participates. To refer to these
qualities in generic terms, it is helpful to take from English concepts 
indicating general states of being : motherhood or fatherhood. I have 
not started with a discretely conceived « mother » or « father ». Rather,
thinking of a mother’s role, say, as part of a larger category of motherhood
is a concession to those systems of nomenclature where we would not wish
to prejudge whether the one through whom ties are traced is taken as 
the source of the qualities in question or as an exemplar of them.
There is another reason for starting, in the Melanesian case, with a divi-
sion between kin. It encapsulates the constant splitting and combining of
social identities across the generations. Splitting and combining also
accompany the English vocabulary of relations. While, as we have seen,
one may differentiate relations of identification from relations of linking
or connecting (the connecting of separate elements), taken together these
may also be understood as types of – or subsumed under – connection. 

























Kinship as a Relation
tiation, and frequently is in English idiom, so that a formal definition 
of a relation as (a combination of ) connection and separation goes against
the thrust of vernacular usage. The formal usage commends itself to
kinship analysis, for it often seems to be echoed in the way in which
people arrange their affairs. All this has been said many times (myself
included, Strathern 1988 : ch. VIII), but is repeated here since, in approa-
ching motherhood and fatherhood, we shall encounter some very delibe-
rate strategies of differentiation and separation (of persons, of relations).
These at once lend credence to the formal position and, it has to be
admitted, often seem in excess of it.
Motherhood and fatherhood are clearly implicated in one another. 
The existence of each is predicated on them both existing. But what does
one need to know to call this a relation ? And what kind of relation might
it be ? Briefly put, how is one to understand all the work that people do
in formulating their own descriptions of connection and separation ?
Might the way anthropologists draw on relations get in the way 6 of 
that understanding ? I stay with Melanesia in this (and longest) section,
before coming to Euro-American ideas as exemplified in English kinship.
It should be clear that this is an address to languages of description and
not an ethnographic exercise.
Describing Relations Through Relations
We have already met a form of motherhood in the Korowai « mother’s
brother ». More or less since kinship studies began, anthropologists 
have sprung on English language users (among others) the consequences
of different modes of kin reckoning. Think of « male mothers » and 
« classificatory fathers ». Such descriptives invariably guide the analyst to
relations that appear to depend either on a mediating link, such as mother
in the case of mother’s brother, or on a relation of identity, as might 
hold between a father and his brother or son. I shall return to the point
that one kin relation is not just categorically distinct from another but
frequently comes into being performatively, through active differentiation7.
Melanesian motherhood, and the same is true of fatherhood, often 
implies or contains within it two kinds of relations with siblings (same 
sex and opposite sex), that show up in terminological or other conse-
quences for their respective offspring. The way mothers relate to their
siblings’ children is bound to the way they relate to their own children.
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6. As « context » can « get in the way » (Tsing 2009 : 47).
7. See James Weiner (1988) for a fully worked out account.
In other words, what it means to be a mother (father) is implicated in
what it means to be a brother (sister). Each, too, is a condition for the
existence of the other. Add generational time, and it becomes evident that
it is in their mutual relationship that brother and sister each anticipate
their own and the other’s fatherhood and motherhood. In this configura-
tion, it has long been recognised, the separation of sister from brother is
key to the connection of mother with father. This is at once a social and a
conceptual proposition.
In the language of relations one could say that relations appear to be
described by (other) relations. Of course specific configurations of rela-
tions typify specific systems, but it was something like this that caught the
anthropological imagination in its concern for many years with marriage
exchange. An example from West Papua that was taken up when this
debate was current in British and American anthropology comes from the
Tor area described by Gottfried Oosterwal (1961) and was put forward 
as evincing the « simplest » type of system (Rubel & Rosman 1978). 
In condensed form, one sibling’s marriage is described through that of his
or her cross-sex other. Tor practice obviously has its own particularities,
however, and I preface the account with a brief comparative observation.
If separation of maternal from paternal origin is a prerequisite for
connection, it has also long been recognised (even if not articulated 
quite like this) that separation must be reproduced. And to reproduce 
separation over time, past ties may have to be cut to make possibilities
for future ones. Speaking of Mekeo (Papua New Guinea), Mark Mosko
(1983) described such cutting as « de-conception » : ancestral unions 
are un-done so that two sides once bound to each other are no longer
bound, and their descendants can intermarry again. The un-doing in
Mekeo is achieved through reversing or annulling the original marriage
payments that made it possible for the fertility of one set of kin to contri-
bute to that of another.
Tor people (as when Oosterwal described them) achieve separations
through stratagems that on the face of it seem counter-intuitive : far from
cutting relations, they duplicate them. Counter-intuitive also in that these
tiny populations do not separate themselves through group ideology or
seek spouses from afar – they marry largely within the immediate village
(« tribe ») – and there is a marked bilaterality in kin reckoning, 
with minimal terminological differentiation of mother’s and father’s sides.
The ideal marriage, that of a brother-sister pair marrying a brother-sister
pair, is from a man’s point of view sister-exchange. (It is ethnographically
apposite to refer to men’s need for wives, for nearly half the men fail 

























Kinship as a Relation
a husband is in debt to his wife’s elder brother ; indeed, an individual man
can only marry if he has a younger sister or relative to bestow (Oosterwal
1961 : 103). In the next generation, the children of these two unions may
be marriage partners themselves 8. Cousin twice over, a woman’s husband
may be at once her maternal uncle’s son (MBS) and the son of her
paternal aunt (FZS). Through whichever parent the relation is traced, the
cousin is encountered as an outcome of the separate marriages of brother
and sister. Can we describe this as separation duplicated ? If so, this 
form of sister exchange detaches sister from brother through the pivotal
creation of the brother-in-law (WB/ZH). Separation of motherhood 
from fatherhood appears contingent on men’s agency 9.
Perhaps this is not so far off what Tor men themselves describe. A ritual
distinction between father and mother’s brother creates in another register
a division between connections through men and through women, for
brothers-in-law treat their respective children differently. A boy’s mother’s
brother is responsible for his first initiation. At this the boy is given an
initiation flute by his father, in effect a gift to the boy and his MB, 
who together form a « flute line » (brothers-in-law give to one another’s
flute-owning lines). Giving a flute to the son does not identify father and
son ; rather, the gift emphatically differentiates them, for the father
belongs to the flute-line of his nephew (ZS) (Ibid. : 235). In effect, the
father is describing his son as his brother-in-law’s nephew. The boy,
thereby seen from two perspectives, reflects back the distinction between
motherhood (MB) and fatherhood (F) among men.
Women, absent from the flute-blowing rituals, are crucial to this 
relation between brothers-in-law. The dependency of men on women, for
procreation, for food (also in short supply ; women are the sole providers
of sago), is a theme of Oosterwal’s monograph. Through the flutes, men
of the Tor repeat all over again the fact that dependency on women entails
interdependency between men 10. Flutes cause things to grow, and men say
that without flutes the sago on which they live would die. The flute is a
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8. Whether marriage is feasible with parallel cousins varies between the thirteen Tor tribes, though
all allow marriage with cross cousins (« bilateral cross cousin marriage »). Where parallel cousin
marriage is forbidden, such cousins may find they can trace their connections in other ways
(Oosterwal 1961 : 106). Oosterwal was also interested in the variable emphasis that kin termino-
logies put on bilaterality, distinctions ignored here.
9. See James Weiner (1988 : 77) on Foi, where it is men’s responsibility to maintain conceptual
distinction between the sexes.
10. « [M]arriage by exchange always implies a double exchange » (Oosterwal 1961 : 235). The
ideal marriage entails both the direct exchange of sisters (within one generation) and the indirect
exchange of flutes (across generations). The father’s gift is said to compensate his brother-in-law’s
line for the loss of the sister’s life-giving powers, that is, detaches her from it. In rare circumstances
a flute may be given, in lieu of a sister, for a bride.
giver of life, just as a bride is. But the one cannot ordinarily substitute 
for the other (see footnote 10) : brothers-in-law give different life-giving
powers to their offspring because men need both. A boy’s relations with
his father (from whom a flute comes) and his mother’s brother (from
whom a wife is seen to come) reiterate the prior distinction between wife-
taker and wife-giver that foreshadowed his own existence. Divisions
between persons are in this sense performative, in that they bring about
the conditions for procreation and growth.
What is Concealed in this Description ?
Within the description just given are elements of many anthropological
conversations, including engagement with kin terminology, exchange 
relations, and attempts at cross-cultural analyses of kinship, both formally
and – as in Sahlins’s case – substantively. They are not rehearsed here. 
I should, however, say that the present focus on motherhood and 
fatherhood was inspired by the formal elucidation of a cross-cultural
model presented by Michael Houseman (1988) a quarter of a century ago.
To return to his argument is beyond the scope of this chapter ; I disembed
from its theoretical location there his linking (relating) of two concepts,
recursiveness and indeterminacy. The link fleshes out what might lie
behind the impetus to describe or duplicate relations through relations.
In a comparison of two West African tales about marriage and pro-
creation, Houseman demonstrates an asymmetry between fatherhood and
motherhood in each case, in that one (not both) of the parental figures is
shown to have an indeterminate character that is only resolved through
recursive reference to other figures. Fatherhood in one case and motherhood
in the other, the reference is « to higher-order (and temporally prior)
versions of themselves » (1988 : 670). Procreation cannot ensue without
the parent’s capacity being thus validated. For men of the Tor perhaps
there is something like indeterminacy in sister exchange. It would rest in
how a sister should be defined, in the uncertain lien men have on female
relatives to give in return for wives, such that the claim (the « ideal »)
always has to be predicated on other versions of itself. For it is « sister-
exchange » that appears to be repeated, not cousin marriage. These
versions encompass, then, both prior enactments of sister exchange and
the possibility of future substitutions. A sister’s daughter will do if an
unmarried man has no sister to bestow. Pragmatically this may bring a
mother’s brother and his nephew into conflict ; formally it is a version of
sister exchange that ignores generational difference but keeps the difference


























Kinship as a Relation
in this way [Oosterwal 1961 : 103]). The indeterminacy of sister exchange
renders contingent all the benefits men can receive from a fertile union.
Asymmetry is evident. The sister/wife remains outside this activity : it is
men who have to work to ensure they have sisters and wives.
We begin to gain an insight into what might be concealed in descriptions
of « relations » as the subject of reduplication or recursive referencing. Or,
better put, we have to understand what relations under such conditions
are. If there is a strongly performative element in iterations of the 
appropriate alignment of relationships, this needs to be brought out in 
the anthropologist’s description too. Michael Houseman (1988 : 672)
remarks of one aspect of his model that the way indeterminacy is resolved
never reaches an interpretation of relations between motherhood and
fatherhood that is conclusive or complete : we may say of Tor that diverse
interpretive possibilities as to how a man finds a « sister » to bestow 
always remain. Maybe recursion and the reproduction of indeterminacy
serve local ends, likely to slip out of sight when the (anthropologists’)
descriptive focus is on relations that evince « kinship ». Maybe people’s
overt concerns with propagation are part of the performance. In Melanesia
these often appear as an obsession with growth.
If Tor kinship supposedly exemplifies a simple system, that of Ambrym,
from Papua New Guinea’s neighbour, Vanuatu, has canonically been taken
as the very opposite. Knut Rio’s modern ethnography clears away the
confusion. What it shows, repeated in many registers, is the way in which
women « circulate in marriage in order to produce […] [an] essential shift
of generations between father and son » (2007 : 90). Women who leave
their father’s place as sisters come back, after two generations, as wives, 
a process concealed by the image of paternal kin as « layers of men » in
one place. The image is striking : it is a man not a woman who is seen
standing in the house door (Ibid. : 118). But how is a man to be replaced
by his son ? The indeterminacy of this reproductive ambition, we might
say, requires the son enacting a version of what produced the father : 
in the « exchange of mothers » between them, the father marries the son’s
mother and the son marries the father’s « mother » 11.
This « ideology of mother exchange » precipitates a « circle of women »,
invisible from the house door, but evident from a point that visualises past
and future marriages simultaneously. Knut Rio talks of a recycling of 
relations ; Ambrym men point to yams (Rio links the two as « circles 
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11. His FZDD, who is of the « stream of blood » of his FM (Rio 2007 : 90). This is of course a
highly truncated account, adapted for my purposes to make concrete the interweaving of human
and vegetative propagation ; it is as « mothers » that men plant a father-yam that will bear a 
son-yam (Ibid. : 117-118).
of production » [Ibid. : 102]). Yams grow on their mounds in a circle,
though that becomes hard to discern in the mass of mature vegetation.
The end in sight is growth (a yam vine « grows into a circle and “comes
back” in order to produce growth [underground] » [Ibid. : 119]). 
This requires putting out of sight (in the ground) and, I extrapolate,
rendering uncertain just how the old yam that is planted will have
produced new bodies.
Discerning human propagation in the yam garden is a familiar theme 
in the Trobriand Islands, ancient and modern. Mark Mosko refers to
present times in elucidating the « fractal recursions » of three points, base,
body and tip, in the embodiment of diverse activities. He starts with 
the reproduction of yams, although he could as well have started with the
notion of lives succeeding lives, with the nature of human sexual arousal
or the child as a fractal recursion of its parent (2009 : 693-694) 12. Parents
do not just procreate, they also grow children, right up to the « tip » of
human life in old age « when parents’ contributions to adult children
emanate chiefly from their minds in the form of magical and other secret
knowledge » (Ibid. : 693). Such growth is open to numerous possibilities 
of diversion ; it has no guarantee. We might conclude that growth is the
iteration of conditions for growth.
Finally, what was also missing, in the sense of not being explicit, 
from the description of Tor marriage relations was the extent of my 
re-description. Taking up new issues in attending to old material is propa-
gation of a kind. And there are new purposes : thus I have introduced
indeterminacy and recursion in order to lay specific grounds for approa-
ching relations in an English context. Motherhood and fatherhood ? 
Let me come to the point, and to why this account positively requires
« imaginative devices ».
The Tip of the Account 13
I reintroduce Angkaiyakmin in order to conclude with an observation
made of them. They too have a tripartite image of the transformation
(growth) of entities into one another, drawing for inspiration on trees 
as well as taro gardens. If the way connections are traced through men 
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12. « The feeding of cooked yams to family members […] recapitulates the conversions of
harvested yams into […] garden heaps, storage houses, [and through exchange] male wealth,
banana-leaf bundles, and so on. In all these transformations, fractal recursions of body, base, and
tip unfold as life-stages culminating in death, fruit, and new life sequences » (Mosko 2009 : 693).
13. Angkaiyakmin stories return to their beginning – only after they have branched out and
reached the crown [as in a tree] is the base revealed (Crook 1999 : 229).
kin, the mother’s with more than one kind, it is a version of the contrast
found in story-telling that goes straight for a while, like a tree trunk, then
branches into diverse directions. This feature of narrative supplements the
way in which bodies are seen as composed of bodies, for – as on the
Trobriands – knowledge is part of what transpires between kin : « knowledge
is composed through other people’s bodily resources » (Crook 2007 : 29).
Now foregrounding the elucidation of relations serves the anthropolo-
gist’s own knowledge-seeking ends, insofar as relations between elements
of an exposition have the virtue of showing how phenomena are linked,
can be put into context, are functions of other phenomena, and so on.
However, « kinship relations » in the Melanesian material considered here
are often credited with performative effects or outcomes (reproduction,
growth, emergence of [old] life [newly] embodied). The counterpart
« performance » for the anthropologist engaged with description as a mode
of knowledge-making is, simply, effective description. Exposition is not
the only relational form available, however, and turning to the images and
analogies by which people describe things does more than simply extend
one’s subject matter. Sago-growing flutes from the Tor, an Ambrym man
in the doorway, the base and tip of the Trobriand yam : these work as
highly condensed moments of recognition, of identification 14. So this is
motherhood ! – or fatherhood ! They are openings to conceptual worlds.
In these particular conceptual worlds, activations of motherhood 
and fatherhood may be distributed across diverse relations ; if they are 
not tethered to what in English appear as mothers and fathers, they 
are not tethered to a relation between themselves either.
Tony Crook is clear that relations are central to anthropological
discourse, and has a deft solution for how to push into the background 
a vocabulary based on them (see footnote 5). Entailed in this is the role 
of knowing in Angkaiyakmin kinship. When his Angkaiyakmin teacher
in an imagistic gesture opened his thigh, the shiny membrane under 
the skin was understood to be « advice » or « knowledge ». So perhaps 
we had already met in Crook’s teacher a form of fatherhood, for a man’s
main source of important knowledge is his father. There is an internal
asymmetry. A father imagines all a son has to do is listen to what the
father says over and again ; by contrast, what sons hear sounds incomplete,
and to make things intelligible they branch out by adding what they 
learn from other sources, especially the mother’s brother (Crook 2007 :
115-116). This duplication gives rise to further uncertainty. Only healthy
bodies (person, taro) give consistent evidence of knowledge’s shining
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14. On the part of writer hopefully conveyed to reader (of the description).
effect. Knowledge shapes growing taro plants as particular kinds of talk
shape kinship. For effective knowledge has an effective outcome : « [t]he
point of knowing in Bolivip is growing » (Crook 1999 : 239).
Knowledge as Kinship
It might seem perverse to introduce, as a brief entry into English
kinship 15, an example of motherhood in the absence of fatherhood, but it
has a certain ethnographic verity. In the context of concerns over geneti-
cally modified food, Cathrine Degnen interviewed mothers in northern
England about what their children ate. Anxieties about the effects of food
on children’s bodies were most acute for infants ; mothers would buy
organic food (« as nature designed it ») for their babies even when they did
not eat it themselves (2009 : 55). Of a recalcitrant child, a mother said :
« it were such a worry for me because I wanted him […] to grow and
develop and feed his brain […] and I were like “he’s not eating, he’s only
eating custard creams [a sweet biscuit] ! ” » (Ibid. : 54). I have noted 
elsewhere the extent to which the challenge to a woman’s motherhood
includes her responsibility for the knowledge she has of the world. Proper
growth depends on that. A second mother : « [I]t used to strike me as a bit
revolting when you’d see another young baby eating or chewing […] really
sort of greasy bakery sausage roll things and I’d think [apropos the baby’s
caretaker] “you don’t know what is in that !” » (Ibid. : 53). The point of
knowing is growing, we (anthropologists) might almost say ; in fact we
(English-speakers) do not say it like this.
A mother applies her knowledge to the way she raises her child ; 
its source, and much of its authority, lies outside her relationship to the
child or the child’s father – it is knowledge about child-raising. Child-
raising is a compartment (Dumont’s « sub-system » !) of knowledge about
the world. Describing this 16, the ethnographer might say the mother
« relates » it to her situation. Indeed the conceptual world in which 
(as elsewhere) relations receive expression as « kinship » is also (here) to be
understood as a world of knowledge-making ; in the hands of English-
speakers relating is a significant epistemological device. We should ask
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15. For the sake of argument I draw on particular interpretations of « English kinship » presented
in Marilyn Strathern (1992, 2005), and elsewhere, to which I only once make separate reference.
On « Euro-American » kinship thinking, see Jeanette Edwards’ pertinent discussion (2009).
16. Cathrine Degnen (2009 : 55) asks a mother how her « relationship with » organic food 
developed.
One prominent area in which knowledge would seem intrinsic to kin
relations also renders it extrinsic ; this is the relation between motherhood
and fatherhood as a matter of procreative capacity. The indeterminate
nature of paternity means that how a father is known is crucial to his 
identity (though not to his fertility). In today’s modes of procreation such
uncertainty can also affect women ; thus between commissioning mother
and surrogate mother, the paramount question is not who is the surro-
gate, it is who is the « real » mother (whose role is closest to what we know
motherhood really is). In neither case is indeterminacy resolved with
recursive reference to other parental figures ; in any event it is impossible
for generational time to go back on itself. Reference will be to what is
known in other compartments of knowledge, for example in the one case
about biology, in the other about the legality of a contract. This is not
because recursion is unthinkable 17 ; it is perhaps because of the way a (kin)
relative must appear as a role-player, a person. We return to this shortly.
Ignorance of paternity is expressed as an issue of knowledge in many
cultural contexts. Everything turns, of course, on how knowledge behaves
in the conceptual world in question. Here, ignorance is defined by 
practices of verification, and what is relevant is the shape given to truth 
by « relating ». Dividing knowledge (the world) into compartments serves
at once as a powerful exemplar of how apparently separate entities may 
be brought into connection (including those of cause and effect) and, 
in the constant need to know, reinstates indeterminacy. (It was the genius
of the scientific revolution to suffuse « the world » with uncertainty about
what it was.) Thus desiring to know about a world conceived of as natural
raises questions about nature ; pari passu, social and society. The contingent
or indeterminate nature of a cosmos thus conceived is controlled through
relating insofar as its particulate entities can be rendered intelligible in
relation to one another ; once relations are established, fresh demonstra-
tions of relations can be added. At the same time this conceptual world
has a huge capacity for internal expansion, for every domain contains
elements that can also be seen as parts of other domains. Switching 
viewpoints in this way give us what I have called merographic relations
(Strathern 1992 : 73).
So how are motherhood and fatherhood « related » in this cosmology ?
And what kind of relation is it ? First, a relation of comparison. Insofar 
as both entail procreation and child-raising, motherhood and fatherhood
are each instances of parenthood – in English, fathers are not another kind
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17. On the contrary, « nature », in this context, is an object of constant recursive referencing : 
the infant close to nature that must be fed with natural food ; the real (natural) parent referred
back to natural (real) behaviour or attributes.
of mother ; they are another kind of parent. Second, not unconnected,
merographic relations. Kinship evokes a role-playing or relational « part »
of the individual person (concomitantly, kinship is thought of as a
« part » of society). Whatever the effectiveness of knowledge 18, in this
context it is tied to relationships in a specific role-playing way. So mothe-
rhood and fatherhood exist as domains of interaction, which may or may
not be compared, in which individual persons participate or through
which their identity is defined 19. Attributes are attached to the figures of
mother and father before they appear as attributes of others : a maternal
uncle may or may not evince « motherly » behaviour. Indeed, in general,
keeping attributes distinct is a responsibility that not only mothers feeding
their children may evince towards the world 20. How people behave in 
relation to the expectations of their roles (Miller 2007) can be a focus of
intense moral concern.
And the outcome ? It is how persons are known as « mothers » and
« fathers » that seems so important. The outcome of this knowledge is not
procreation as such ; that has an autonomous trajectory. For, although
knowledge is crucial to the flow of (moral/legal/social) identity that in this
system comes with birth, this kind of relating does not enhance fertility 
or parturition. Nor, although the same flow of identity is crucial to the
keeping of genealogies, does it effect the movement of persons through
time and space ; among other things « genetics » determines distance of
connection. Above all this kind of relating tethers motherhood and 
fatherhood to specific persons. Nothing here of the Melanesian recursive-
ness of kinship positions that leads, often in ways that would appear
contradictory in a situation where identities are separated out by context
or sub-system, to descriptions of relations through relations.
English motherhood and fatherhood are not divisions of the cosmos
(rather, the cosmos is divided by knowledge of it) or even of the world 
of kin. They relate to each other as particulates through the comparison of
particular characteristics and circumstances. These in turn can be related,
merographically, to numerous contexts outside « kinship » in which
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18. It will be appreciated how abbreviated this account is. There are in the vernacular many kinds
of knowledge, including « emotional knowledge », that would qualify the depiction here.
19. David Schneider’s comments on the relative as a person, « playing a role in real life », remain
pertinent : each of the « different elements which are combined into the definition of a person
[comes] from its own domain » (1968 : 57-58).
20. Sandra Bamford (2009 : 170) enlarges on some of the relational consequences of genetic
modification. (It will be appreciated that keeping attributes distinct is different from being respon-
sible for bringing distinctions into being ; see footnote 9.)
the law, transmission of disease). There is an epistemological premise of
concordance, or homology, between entities and the contexts in which
they are found, and, correspondingly, « difference » across contexts 21.
However many internal differences, comparison always implies an 
overarching context that provides grounds for similarity – and does so for
relations both of identification (« brotherhood is in itself the general form
of the relation » [Viveiros de Castro 2004 : 18]) and of linking. In effect,
one can only relate what is related. The work of relating includes the work
of making explicit – making knowledge out of – relations that are already
there. As to recursiveness, then, one is invariably led back to the constant
referencing of knowledge to other orders of itself that relations enable.
Knowledge-making includes gathering together and making distinctions
in like measure. But might one hazard that the efficacy sought in 
descriptive relating – creating connections, telling a story – affects 
the overridingly positive gloss put on relating in the vernacular ? If so,
anthropologists might in turn be alert to the effects on their descriptions
of a language derived from a cultural order where relationality is first 
and foremost connection (of disparate entities). There is an illustration to
hand. « Differentiated by clanship and place-ownership, nonetheless, as a
nephew said, squeezing his own thigh » ; writing in English I had to insert
the qualifying « nonetheless » (that is, despite distance, the two [MB and
ZS] are close), or else it would have read oddly. However many times the
(Anglophone) anthropologist insists on separation and differentiation as
equally intrinsic to the act of relating, the language pulls away. And of all
concepts, kinship (« families and relatives ») is somehow connection first
and differentiation second 22. It takes great effort, as Rupert Stasch attests,
to pull the language around for use elsewhere. Idiomatic usage that 
privileges connection is like the usage that understands sociality as socia-
bility or mutuality as benign before it is malevolent.
Nonetheless
This re-description of mine dilates on what Roy Wagner (1977)
expressed so succinctly in the opening pages of « Analogic Kinship »,
though with a particular interest in knowledge-making as entailed in
description. A bit mischievously perhaps, the title for the previous section
was a phrase deployed by James Leach (2009) for Reite, Papua New
Guinea. Knowledge there, he says, connects people as a form of kinship.
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21. I am trying to convey a folk construction ; it is of course tautologous.
22. Obviously, insofar as differentiation (the individuality of entities) is taken for granted (Wagner
1977 ; Weiner 1988 ; Viveiros de Castro 2004).
So close to what we might say of English kinship thinking, and so far
from it. English kinsfolk are preoccupied with the potential enlargement
of anything they know about kin relations by anything they know about
the world. The substantive contrast between these contexts provides a
reason for considering the kinship of motherhood and fatherhood 
according to the conceptual worlds they evoke, and I have taken ones in
which « relations » have distinct work to do. Relating cannot be the same
kind of device in the two locations, nor have the same kinds of effect.
In the former, the relation between mother and father, that might be
imagined as the starting point for thinking about motherhood and 
fatherhood, is more outcome than premise. It is an ongoing outcome of
numerous relations, of which the conjoined separations of brother/sister
and husband/wife have been touched upon. Constant referencing of other
relations creates the condition for iterations of a performative kind. In the
latter, mothers and fathers exist as individual persons, and anything to be
asked about the relation between motherhood and fatherhood depends on
the context of the question, including how they are implicated in one
another. It is specific compartments of human life that are aligned with,
related to, one another, just as a mother relates her responsibility for 
child-raising to how she shops*.
University of Cambridge, Cambridge (England)
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* This article originated in an invitation from Laurent Barry, Klaus Hamberger and Michael
Houseman to elucidate contemporary perspectives on kinship through the presentation of a
specific approach ; they suggested it might be interesting to take up the topic of motherhood/
fatherhood within the framework of the organization of kinship relations in general, in which a
Melanesia/Euro-American divide could provide the springboard for an overall cross-cultural 
hypothesis. I am grateful to them for the impetus. A version of this article was presented to
colleagues at the University of Toronto, for whose stimulating comments I am very grateful, 
as I am for an earlier conversation with Michael Houseman..
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Anthropological approaches to kinship
« today » can benefit from work on the recur-
sive nature of relations, which certainly illu-
minates the motherhood/fatherhood pair.
Each term is implicated in the other, but that
this mutual implication should be imagined
as a « relation » that can then be compared to
other « relations » is a Euro-American formu-
lation. However widely and generally
applied, such a relation can only be known
through specific epistemological devices, and
these may be as foreign to other contexts as
much as they may run up against devices
foreign to them. Drawing on Anglophone
materials, this article confronts a compara-
tive approach to motherhood and fathe-
rhood.
Marilyn Strathern, La parenté comme relation.
— Les perspectives de recherche actuelles en
anthropologie de la parenté peuvent tirer
profit des travaux effectués sur la nature
récursive des relations, qui apportent un
éclairage nouveau sur les notions de mater-
nité et de paternité. Ces deux notions sont
indissociables l’une de l’autre, mais le fait que
cette interaction soit pensée comme une
« relation » qui sera ensuite comparée avec
d’autres formes de mises en « relations » 
est une représentation euro-américaine.
D’autant que, même si elle est largement
répandue, cette approche de la relation ne
peut être envisagée que grâce à un dispositif
épistémologique spécifique différent et 
éloigné d’autres contextes. Le présent article,
s’appuyant sur des études anglophones, 
compare diverses manières de concevoir la
maternité et la paternité.
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